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The Voting Analytic Hierarchy Process Revisited: A Revised Method with 
Application to Sustainable Supplier Selection
Abstract
Civil society increasingly holds focal companies accountable for ensuring socially and 
environmentally sustainable production standards among their supply base. These standards entail 
increased levels of complexity to be addressed by appropriately designed tools, such as the Voting 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (VAHP) proposed by Liu and Hai (2005). This method of multi-criteria 
group decision making structures decision criteria in a hierarchical fashion as per Saaty’s Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) and employs data envelopment analysis (DEA) for deriving criteria weights 
from the ordinal preferences of the group members. Compared to AHP, the method permits a simpler 
application in a group decision context. However, its theoretical underpinnings have been questioned 
in the literature. This specifically concerns (i) the requirement of a strong convex order for the 
importance weights of ordinal rank gradations, and (ii) the choice of discrimination threshold for 
consecutive rank weights in the underlying DEA model. We propose a revised VAHP method that 
overcomes both issues (i) and (ii) by pursuing a game-theoretic approach to elicitation of criteria 
weights — so as to remove subjectivity from rank discrimination. We illustrate the application of the 
method on a real-world problem of sustainable supplier selection. We contribute to theory by 
proposing a more robust VAHP tool that helps supply chain and purchasing managers selecting 
suppliers based on a comprehensive set of criteria spanning all three sustainability dimensions 
(economic, environmental, and social), while coping with parsimonious input by group decision-
makers.
Keywords: supplier selection, sustainability, multi-criteria decision making, group decisions, ordinal 
preferences, preference aggregation, game theory.
1. Introduction
Reduction of trade barriers, digitalisation and related communication technologies as well as 
efficient long-haul carriage has enabled companies to tap comparative cost advantages by 
increasing their ratio of international sourcing, in particular from emerging and developing 
economies (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014). While international sourcing from other 
continents has become a strategic option even for small and medium-sized enterprises located 
in the industrialized world (Rodríguez and Nieto 2016), the collateral damage of this business 
strategy has received increasing societal attention through media coverage of unethical 
business conduct, labour and human rights violation, environmental pollution, and product 
safety issues (Wolf 2014). Often referring to the concept of sustainability as defined and 
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popularized by the Brundtland report (WCED 1987), NGOs, trade unions and other pressure 
groups (forging alliances with consumer groups at times) have vigorously denounced those 
adverse side-effects of international business and have lifted them up the political agenda of 
developed countries (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014).
Companies have responded to related threats to their brand image and their ‘social license to 
operate’ (Demuijnck and Fasterling 2016) mostly by ensuring minimum standards throughout 
their supply chains; however, even minimum standards are not easy to achieve given supply 
networks’ complexity, buyer–supplier distance and lack of transparency (Gold and 
Heikkurinen 2018). While the extraordinary challenge of managing suppliers for 
sustainability is rather non-controversial, the significant role of supplier selection and 
evaluation as preconditions of effective supplier management is also beyond dispute. Scholars 
have taken up the challenge and developed tools of sustainable supplier selection, in particular 
for the concluding step of the four-step supplier selection process according to De Boer et al. 
(2001) — following on from problem definition, formulation of selection criteria and 
preselection of candidates. Zimmer et al. (2016) show in their review paper that these 
selection tools often do not consider all three dimensions of sustainability equally but neglect 
social aspects. Still, recently there has been a growing number of supplier selection 
approaches that simultaneously integrate criteria from the triple bottom line (Dyllick and 
Hockerts 2002) — comprising the social, environmental, and economic dimension (e.g., 
Awasthi et al. 2018, Bai and Sarkis 2010, Kannan et al. 2015). Although managers often 
prefer making decisions based on intuition or heuristics, Ishizaka and Siraj (2018) have used 
incentive-based experiments to demonstrate the — also subjectively perceived — usefulness 
of decision support by multi-criteria decision-making tools.
Given the challenges of sustainable supplier selection regarding data availability, credibility 
and uncertainty (Awasthi et al. 2018), committees of experts are well suited for this task as 
they hold complementary opinions and experience that reduce the risk of biased decisions. 
The members of those committees of experts are frequently recruited from across various 
firm-internal functions and may be complemented by external stakeholders (Watkins 1999). 
The advantages of group decision making in terms of reduced bias and increased 
organisational legitimacy of the final decision face its disadvantages in terms of the workload 
associated with the elicitation of the experts’ preferences and the complexity of aggregating 
individual preferences. Workload and complexity augment strongly with the number of 
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supplier selection criteria, which rise exponentially with each added dimension of 
sustainability.
The supplier selection problem has been tackled by a wide variety of methods proposed in the 
literature including multi-objective programming, analytical hierarchy process (AHP), 
analytical network process (ANP), data envelopment analysis (DEA) and artificial neural 
networks. Among those, the Voting Analytic Hierarchy Process (VAHP) has gained 
considerable attention, as it is a multi-criteria group decision-making method featuring 
reduced complexity in comparison to AHP while maintaining its systematic nature (Liu and 
Hai 2005). To this end, the VAHP method employs a DEA approach for deriving criteria 
weights from the ordinal preferences of the group members. However, its theoretical 
underpinnings have been questioned in the literature (Llamazares and Peña 2009, Wang et al. 
2007). This specifically concerns (i) the requirements imposed on the weights of ordinal rank 
gradations in the underlying DEA model, and (ii) arbitrariness of discrimination between 
ordinal rank gradations. Based on a game-theoretic approach to deriving criteria weights 
(Tüselmann et al. 2015), we propose a revised VAHP method that overcomes both issues. We 
contribute to theory by proposing a more robust VAHP tool that copes with a comprehensive 
set of decision criteria as well as parsimonious input by group decision-makers, which 
describes the specific decision situation of sustainable supplier selection that we use as an 
application case.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of related 
literature. In Section 3 we present the detailed rationale and procedure of the VAHP method. 
Section 4 critically discusses its shortcomings and proposes a revised method for overcoming 
them. Section 5 presents application of the revised method to sustainable supplier selection at 
a real-world company. Section 6 discusses results of the application and concludes with 
avenues for future research.
2. Literature Review
Our study is most closely related to three research areas: supplier selection criteria and 
methods, sustainable supplier selection, and preference aggregation using data envelopment 
analysis. In the stream of supplier selection literature, the seminal work by Dickson (1966) 
has offered an important insight into the criteria used by companies for evaluating and 
selecting suppliers. By conducting a survey among 170 procurement professionals, Dickson 
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identified a list of 23 such criteria, which have further been rated by their average importance 
as perceived by the respondents (Yahya and Kingsman 1999). Dickson’s results reveal that 
the price of goods has not been seen as the most important criterion of supplier selection; 
instead, factors such as quality, delivery and performance history have been found to be of a 
higher importance because they may have a stronger economic impact on the performance of 
the buying company than the price charged by the supplier. A literature review conducted by 
Weber et al. (1991) over two decades later has nevertheless revealed that the criterion most 
frequently used in academic research has still been the price, followed by delivery and quality. 
This seems to have changed over the next two decades, as the literature review by Ho et al. 
(2010) reveals the most popular criteria in the literature to be quality, delivery, and price, 
followed by manufacturing capability and service.
Evidence suggests that the criteria list by Dickson (1966) and their relative importance has 
been sustained for a long time in industry practice (Yahya and Kingsman 1999). Still, new 
criteria have entered the list over time, reflecting new developments in industry. Weber et al. 
(1991) highlight in this regard Just-in-Time (JIT) criteria. Apart from JIT, Cheraghi et al. 
(2004) further identified supplier flexibility and reliability as new criteria referred to by 
academic research, among others. A survey of literature by Thiruchelvam and Tookey (2011) 
shows that criteria of environmental and social responsibility have received some attention 
over the subsequent decade. As work on sustainable supply chain management has recently 
seen a significant growth (Rajeev et al. 2017), this has been reflected in the stream of 
literature on sustainable supplier selection. Zimmer et al. (2016) offer a recent comprehensive 
review of this stream of literature and identify 448 unique supplier selection criteria used 
across 143 research publications over the time span from 1997 to 2014. Of these, 52.5% of 
criteria refer to the economic dimension of sustainability, 38.1% to the environmental one, 
and only 9.4% to the social dimension. Indeed, 59% of the studies reviewed address economic 
and environmental dimensions only. In this regard, Zimmer et al. (2016) stress the insufficient 
attention that the social criteria have received in the literature to date, which can be explained 
by difficulties in measurement and quantification of social aspects, as well as different 
political, ethical and ideological attitudes of stakeholders (Zimmer et al. 2016).
Wetzstein et al. (2016) emphasise the ever-growing importance of supplier selection as supply 
chains became more international, a larger proportion of operations are outsourced, and more 
criteria making the selection increasingly complex. Despite the strategic commitment to 
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improve the sustainability of their supply chains, in everyday practice many companies 
struggle to incorporate sustainability aspects in their supplier selection decisions and the 
ultimate selection decision is still often dominated by economic considerations (Karjalainen 
and Salmi, 2013; Genovese et al. 2013) and a lower price may be achieved at the risk of lower 
environmental or ethical standards (Goebel et al. 2012). However, at a strategic sourcing 
level — which ought to precede the supplier selection decision — companies will direct the 
selection process by focussing for example on geographies and supply market structures, and 
categorise supplier on their capabilities, for example the ability to innovate or responsiveness 
(Li and Shao 2015; Trautrims et al. 2017). 
The supplier selection process is usually conducted in four stages as described for example by 
Cousins et al. (2000): initial supplier qualification, agreement of measurement criteria, 
obtainment of relevant information, and the selection itself. One can however argue that the 
first step of initial supplier qualification is already pre-selecting suppliers on set criteria. At 
this stage compliance to labour standards and other sustainability considerations can be 
included. Suppliers who fail to satisfy the initial supplier qualification will be excluded from 
further stages in the process. This approach can be considered the procurement equivalent to 
Hill’s (1985) concept of order-qualifiers and order-winners, in which suppliers who do not 
satisfy the qualification criteria will not proceed to the stage where the order winners come 
into play.
Given the multi-criteria nature of the subsequent supplier selection step, the literature offers a 
broad range of methods for decision-making support. Yahya and Kingsman (1999) offer an 
elaborate discussion of strengths and weaknesses of various methods from simple, like 
categorical and weighted-average methods, to more advanced, such as data envelopment 
analysis (DEA), which is instrumental in overcoming the issue of subjective criteria weighting. 
They further highlight the strengths of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) in structuring 
evaluation criteria in the form of a hierarchy and eliciting expert preferences on the relative 
importance of criteria. Indeed, Ho et al. (2010) found out that the most popular decision-
making approaches used in the literature have been DEA and AHP, followed by goal 
programming, while combinations of AHP and DEA represented the most popular integrated 
approach. Findings by Zimmer et al. (2016) in the area of sustainable supplier selection 




As indicated in the Introduction, the Voting Analytic Hierarchy Process (VAHP), proposed 
originally by Liu and Hai (2005), represents an integrated method of supplier selection that 
proves useful in group decision-making, especially when a large number of criteria is 
involved. The method features a combination of the AHP approach for structuring the criteria 
in the form of a hierarchy, and DEA for deriving group preference with regard to criteria from 
the ordinal preferences of individual group members, who are required to submit their 
preferences in a ranked voting system. This approach significantly reduces the workload in 
comparison to AHP. To date a broad number of approaches to preference aggregation in 
ranked voting systems have been proposed in the literature, see Cook and Kress (1990) and 
Llamazares and Peña (2009) for a review. The principal paradigm adopted in the recent 
research work in this area is that of the DEA, which helps to overcome the decision-maker’s 
subjective bias in multi-attribute performance evaluation and achieve a fair assessment 
(Charnes et al. 1978). Cook and Kress (1990) have been the first to apply this to aggregation 
of ordinal preferences; their approach has further been revised and extended by follow-up 
research (Green et al. 1996, Hashimoto 1997, Noguchi et al. 2002, Wang et al. 2007). Liu and 
Hai (2005) have specifically adopted the DEA approach of Noguchi et al. (2002) in 
implementing the VAHP method. However, as indicated in the Introduction, its theoretical 
underpinnings have been questioned in the literature (Llamazares and Peña 2009, Wang et al. 
2007). Our work accordingly proposes a revised method following Tüselmann et al. (2015) 
that overcomes this criticism and offers a more robust supplier selection tool, which we test in 
a real-world application. In the next section we present the detailed rationale and procedure of 
the VAHP method.
3. The Voting Analytic Hierarchy Process
The Voting Analytic Hierarchy Process (VAHP) has been proposed by Liu and Hai (2005) as 
a method of multi-criteria decision making that combines essential elements of the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (Saaty 1980) and data envelopment analysis (Charnes et al. 1978). It is 
specifically designed to suit decision making by committees of experts and has been framed 
by Liu and Hai as a supplier selection method in the following six steps:
Step 1: Determine criteria for supplier evaluation. In the initial step, the committee has to 
agree upon the list of specific criteria according to which the candidate suppliers should be 
evaluated. This list can be based on the existing research work as reviewed in Section 2, as 
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well as involve criteria suggested by the committee members based on their professional 
experience. This step may involve two rounds: first, the experts are surveyed for the criteria 
that they consider to be relevant for supplier selection and second, all of the suggested criteria 
are discussed in a joint meeting to clarify their meaning and operationalisation, and settle on 
the ultimate criteria list (Yahya and Kingsman 1999).
Step 2: Structure the hierarchy of the criteria. In the second step, the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process is utilised for structuring the criteria in a hierarchical fashion. In this way, certain 
criteria may be clustered together and made subordinate to the others according to their 
definition, as agreed upon in Step 1. This yields a hierarchy of criteria and sub-criteria. An 
example of a criteria hierarchy, as used by Liu and Hai (2005) based on Yahya and Kingsman 
(1999), is shown in Figure 1. The purpose of producing such a hierarchy is, in the sense of 
AHP, to break down the complex decision problem into constituent parts and thus help the 
experts deliver reliable judgements by dealing with elements of the same order of magnitude 
in each level of the hierarchy (Saaty 2012).
Supplier rating
Quality Financial Facility Responsiveness 
Factory 
audit 


















Figure 1. Hierarchy of criteria used by Liu and Hai (2005) and Yahya and Kingsman (1999).
Step 3: Vote on the importance of criteria and sub-criteria. In this step, the committee 
members are required to submit their individual preferences with respect to the relative 
importance of criteria and sub-criteria. The principal feature of the VAHP that distinguishes it 
from the AHP is that it foregoes the pairwise comparisons between the elements at each level 
of the hierarchy. Instead, the method requires the committee members to submit their 
preferences as ordinal rankings. Specifically, each member has to rank order the criteria 
according to their importance for achieving the superior goal of selecting the most suitable 
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supplier, as perceived by him or her. Further down the criteria hierarchy, each member has to 
rank order the sub-criteria according to their importance for satisfying the parent criterion 
with which they are associated. Thus the child nodes of every branched node in the criteria 
hierarchy become ranked by each committee member according to the importance attached to 
the children in representing the parent. In this way, the committee members are voting on the 
importance of the respective criteria or sub-criteria, which represents a ranked voting system 
(Llamazares and Peña 2009). Assuming that the committee comprises  members, this step n
accordingly yields  preference rankings at each branched node of the criteria hierarchy.n
Let further  represent the number of children of a specific branched node in the hierarchy. K
As devised by Liu and Hai (2005), the VAHP method offers the flexibility of restricting the 
length of rankings to any number  of places, where , so that the committee members L KL 
are required to rank order only their  most preferred criteria or sub-criteria out of  given.L K
Step 4. Derive the importance ratings of criteria and sub-criteria. In the fourth step, the 
individual preferences submitted by the committee members have to be aggregated to rate the 
importance of criteria and sub-criteria from the perspective of the committee as a whole. As 
indicated in Section 2, Liu and Hai (2005) have adopted for this purpose a DEA approach due 
to Noguchi et al. (2002), which we present below.
Consider a branched node in the criteria hierarchy. As before, let  denote the number of its K
children, and  the number of places in the preference rankings submitted by the committee L
members with respect to this node in Step 3. Let  denote the voting matrix, whose elements V
 represent the number of times a (sub-)criterion  has been placed at rank position  by kv k 
the committee members ( , ). The importance rating of (sub-)criterion Lk ,,1  L,,1  
 with respect to its parent node can then be expressed in terms of the weighted average scorek
,kLLkk vwvw  11
where the weights  associated with rank positions  can be understood as the w L,,1  
‘worth of being ranked in the th place’ (Cook et al. 1997), and need to obey the strong order 
 so as to respect the ordinal nature of rankings submitted by the committee Lww 1
members in Step 3. However, any specific choice of such weights by the decision maker is 
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likely to introduce a subjective bias into the importance rating of the (sub-)criteria, favouring 
certain of them and disfavouring the others, which potentially leads to biased decisions and 
undesirable outcomes. This issue can, nevertheless, be resolved by adopting the DEA 
approach (Cook and Kress 1990), which foregoes pre-specified rank weights. Specifically, 
this approach treats the peer (sub-)criteria  as candidates in a preferential election Kk ,,1 
who are allowed, in the DEA spirit, to suggest their own rank weights , . In so w L,,1  
doing, each candidate cross-evaluates himself against his peers in terms of importance rating 
, and selects such rank weights that yield the maximum possible rating score for him. k
Therefore, all rank weights are determined endogenously — by letting the preference data 
‘speak for itself’, thus avoiding the subjective bias. To this end, Liu and Hai (2005) employed 















ivw  Ki ,,1 










In (1), the importance rating score of the th (sub-)criterion is to be maximized. Decision k
variables  ( ), representing the rank weights proposed by the th (sub-)criterion, w L,,1   k
need to satisfy a number of side constraints. Constraint (2) is a standard DEA constraint that 
places an upper bound on the importance rating to be achieved by any (sub-)criterion, 
including the th itself, under the proposed rank weights; this upper bound is normalised to k
unity (Cook and Kress 1990; Green et al. 1996). Constraint (3) is intended to ensure that the 
rank weights decrease from first to last, yet in a convex fashion — so that the difference 
between the first and second places in the ranking is perceived stronger than between the 
second and the third ones, and so on. Constraint (4) ensures that the last rank weight is a 
positive number, for which Noguchi et al. (2002) suggested a minimum threshold as per (5).
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Problem (1)–(4) needs to be solved for each (sub-)criterion , which respectively Kk ,,1 
yields the self-rating  of the respective (sub-)criterion as the optimal objective value in (1). kk
Furthermore, by evaluating the left-hand sides in (2) at the optimal solution, we obtain the 
peer ratings  for , which represent the importance of the peer (sub-)criteria ik Ki ,,1 
from the perspective of the th one. When , the peer rating coincides with the self-rating. k ki 
The peer ratings across all  and  naturally comprise the cross-Ki ,,1  Kk ,,1 
evaluation matrix . By taking a geometric mean of the th row in , we obtain a cross- k 
rating  of the th (sub-)criterion,  (Noguchi et al. 2002). By normalising the k k Kk ,,1 
cross-ratings (Liu and Hai 2005), we obtain the relative importance rating of the th k










After repeating this procedure for each branched node in the criteria hierarchy, we can finally 
express the absolute importance rating of each criterion and sub-criterion with respect to the 
superior goal of selecting the most suitable supplier. This is accomplished in the AHP fashion 
as follows: the absolute importance rating of a criterion is by definition equal to its relative 
importance rating, whereas the absolute importance rating of a sub-criterion is calculated by 
multiplying its relative importance rating by the absolute importance rating of its parent.
Step 5: Measure supplier performance. In the fifth step, the performance of the candidate 
suppliers is measured against those criteria and sub-criteria that are represented by the leaf 
nodes in the criteria hierarchy. Liu and Hai (2005) followed in this regard Yahya and 
Kingsman (1999) and measured the suppliers’ performance against each of those leaf 
(sub-)criteria on a point scale from 0 to 10. Yahya and Kingsman (1999) provide a detailed 
account of how these measurements have been conducted in their case-study, which involved 
both factual data and qualitative judgements.
Step 6: Identify supplier priority. In the final step, an overall rating score is derived for each 
candidate supplier by calculating its weighted average performance across all leaf (sub-) 
criteria, with the weights being equal to the absolute importance rating scores of the latter. A 
supplier’s overall rating score ultimately determines its priority for the company.
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4. Critical Discussion and Revision of the VAHP Method
The VAHP method turns out to be instrumental in reducing the workload required from the 
committee members for submitting their preferences, as compared to the AHP. This 
represents an attractive feature, especially given a large number of supplier selection criteria 
and/or a large number of committee members. Furthermore it has the advantage of using DEA 
for deriving the relative importance of individual criteria from the group perspective, which is 
instrumental in avoiding subjective bias.
Despite these advantages, criticism can be levelled at the DEA approach used in Step 4 of the 
VAHP method. Below, we discuss the points of criticism in detail and we offer a revised 
DEA approach for use in the VAHP method that overcomes this criticism.
4.1 Critical Discussion
4.1.1 Restrictiveness of the Convex Weight Order. As indicated above, constraint (3) of the 
DEA model is intended to ensure a convex decreasing succession of weights  associated w
with rank positions . Specifically, Noguchi et al. (2002) require convexity to hold L,,1  
in the strict sense, i.e.:
. (7)01113221   LL wwwwwwwwww  
While using convex orders has indeed been advocated in the literature on ranked voting 
systems (Stein et al. 1994; Hashimoto 1997), the above strict convexity excludes the popular 
Borda rule — which is questionable, as pointed out by Llamazares and Peña (2009).
4.1.2 Arbitrariness of the Convex Weight Order. Furthermore, Llamazares and Peña (2009) 
point to a certain arbitrariness of the strict convexity imposed by constraint (3). Indeed, (3) is 




















implies the corresponding strict inequality  in (7), where . 11    wwww 1,,2  L









where . Rearranging the terms in (10) gives1,,2  L
, for . (11)  ww  1)1( 1,,2  L
From this, Noguchi et al. (2002) obtain constraint (3). However, this approach raises the 
following two concerns:
1) First, as Llamazares and Peña (2009) note, the choice of the ratio  in (8) is )1/()2(  
rather arbitrary: instead, this ratio could have been replaced with any , which )1,0[1 
would have resulted in a different set of inequalities in (3) as well.
2) Second, we note that (11) applies to  only, which thus defines the following 1,,2  L
inequalities in (3): . However, the subsequent 1321 )1(32  LwLwww 
inequality in (3):  — does not follow from (11). This inequality is LL LwwL  1)1(
seemingly intended to imply the last inequality in (7):  — which it does, 01  LL ww
but, again, in a rather arbitrary way.
4.1.3 Possible Non-convexity of the Sequence of Weights. Surprisingly, constraint (3) does 
not actually guarantee convexity of the sequence of weights . To the best of our Lww ,,1 
knowledge, this has not been noticed in the literature before. In fact, the above derivation of 
constraint (3) has a logical flaw. To see this, observe that the purpose of constraint (3) as per 
Noguchi et al. (2002), is to imply condition (7). However, the way in which (3) has been 
derived does not yield this implication. Indeed, let (4) hold. A closer look at the derivation in 
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Section 4.1.2 reveals the implications shown in Figure 2 — which indicates that constraint (3) 





















Note: Superscripts restrict the respective condition to the specified inequalities, by indicating their running 
numbers.
Figure 2. Logical implications between conditions (3), (7), (9)–(11).
4.1.4 Possible Arbitrariness of Cross-Evaluations. Noguchi et al. (2002) do not specify an 
approach to follow when there exist multiple optimal solutions to problem (1)–(4) (see also 
Llamazares and Peña 2009). The choice of a specific solution does not affect the self-rating 
 of the respective (sub-)criterion , whereas it may affect peer ratings  for kk k ik
. Thus, leaving this choice up to the solver or the analyst solving (1)–(4) }{\},,1{ kKi 
potentially leads to arbitrariness of cross-evaluations and hence, of cross-ratings , where k
. Two approaches are conceivable in such a situation (Green et al. 1996):},,1{ Kk 
AX: Aggressive cross-evaluation, where each (sub-)criterion , acting like a },,1{ Kk 
candidate in a preferential election, chooses those optimal solutions to (1)–(4) that 
respectively minimize the peer ratings  of its individual opponents . ik }{\},,1{ kKi 










introducing an additional constraint
, (2a)kk
L
kvw  1 
and solving problem (1a)–(4) for each , which yields peer ratings .}{\},,1{ kKi  ik
BX: Benevolent cross-evaluation, where each (sub-)criterion  maximizes the },,1{ Kk 
peer ratings of its opponents . This boils down to altering the direction }{\},,1{ kKi 
of optimization in (1a) to ‘maximization’ and proceeding further as in AX.
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Both aggressive and benevolent cross-evaluation can instead be conducted in an aggregate 









K      
This approach, originally due to Sexton et al. (1986), requires solving (1aa)–(4) just once and 
results in a set of weights that equally applies to all candidates. The respective approaches 
will be referred to as AAX and ABX. 
Example 1. Consider the criteria hierarchy shown in Figure 1 and a voting matrix  that V
results from  committee members having voted on  criteria by ranking them on 60n 8K
the ordinal scale of length  in Step 3 of the VAHP method, given in Liu and Hai (2005, 8L
Table 1). In Step 4 of the method, by solving problem (1)–(4) for , we obtain self-rating 3k
 of the criterion ‘Discipline’. However, multiple optimal solutions exist. If we 0.7615533 
let the solver select one (we use the default LP solver from Optimization Toolbox v. 7.6 of 
MATLAB R2017a) then the resulting solution vector  — comprising the weights ),,( 1 Lww 
attached by criterion  to ordinal scale gradations — is as depicted on the left in Figure 3. k
Using aggressive cross-evaluation AX against criterion , we obtain a different solution, 1i
depicted on the right in Figure 3. It obviously represents a non-convex sequence of weights. 
This example shows that cross-evaluations as defined in the VAHP method carry some 
arbitrariness, and that the resulting sequence of weights may turn out to be non-convex indeed.

















Figure 3. Rank weights in Example 1.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
15
4.1.5 Arbitrariness of Rank Discrimination. Consider the threshold  defined in (5) — that 
serves as the lower bound for the last rank weight  as per (4). By taking into account (3), Lw
we obtain that  further determines a minimum difference between any two consecutive rank 
weights. Indeed, it is easy to derive from (3) that conditions









must hold for . From this and (4) we thus have:L,,2  
. (12)1 ( 1)
Lw w       
The right-hand side in (12), denoted by , represents a discrimination intensity  )(:),(  gd 
function that specifies the minimum amount by which the consecutive rank weights must 
respectively differ (Cook and Kress 1990). The optimal solution vector is affected by (i) the 
specific choice of such a function, and (ii) the choice of the threshold . With regard to (i), 
several alternative functions have received attention in the literature — e.g., , , and  /
 (Cook and Kress 1990, Green et al. 1996). Noguchi et al. (2002) neither derive the !/ 
specific expression of  as per (12) nor give arguments for why this function should be ),( d
preferred over the others. Regarding (ii), the problem of choosing  has long been 
acknowledged in the extant literature (Cook and Kress 1990, Green et al. 1996, Llamazares 
and Peña 2009, Park and Jeong 2011, Llamazares and Peña 2013). To address this issue, 
Noguchi et al. (2002) proposed to select  as per (5). Their approach has, however, been 
criticized for its arbitrariness (Wang et al. 2007) — a criticism which we share.
4.2 A Revised Method
In the present work, we propose a revised VAHP method which is intended to remove the 
deficits of the DEA model employed in Step 4 of the original method (Section 4.1). 
Specifically, the proposed revision addresses the issues of (I) arbitrariness, restrictiveness and 
possible non-convexity of the order imposed on rank weights, and (II) arbitrariness of rank 
discrimination. These issues are accordingly addressed below.
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4.2.1 Ensuring a Weakly Convex Weight Order. We address issue (I) by replacing constraint 
(3) with the following:
(13a)11    wwww 1,,2  L
(13b) LL ww 1
In so doing, we follow the approach advocated by Stein et al. (1994) and Hashimoto (1997). 
This approach removes the deficits explained in Sections 4.1.1–3 because: 1) it permits the 
Borda rule by requiring a weakly convex sequence of weights in (13a); 2) it removes the 
arbitrariness of strict convexity imposed by the original method; and 3) it removes the 
possibility of obtaining a non-convex sequence of weights by enforcing convexity in (13a). 
Solving (1), (2), (13), (4) for each given  accordingly yields self-ratings . },,1{ Kk  kk
In order to obtain peer ratings  for , we propose using the aggressive form ik }{\},,1{ kKi 
of cross-evaluation AAX (Section 4.1.4) so as to remove arbitrariness of choice between 
multiple optimal solutions of problem (1), (2), (13), (4) and better discriminate between 
criteria (Green et al. 1996), while still applying the same set of weights equally to all 
candidates. This requires solving problem (1aa), (2), (2a), (13), (4) for each . },,1{ Kk 
While Noguchi et al. (2002) employ the geometric mean of peer ratings , , to ik Ki ,,1 
obtain cross-rating  of a th (sub-)criterion (Section 3), we advocate using harmonic k k
means for this purpose. The reason for this is that problem (1), (2), (13), (4) represents an 
input-oriented DEA model with  outputs and a single input, equal to unity (Lovell and L
Pastor 1999). It is well-known that the optimal objective value of an input-oriented model 
represents an input reduction factor for reaching the best-practice frontier by the decision-
making unit and thus its inverse radial distance to that frontier (Balk et al. 2017; Cooper et al. 
2011, Section 1.5). Therefore, averaging peer ratings in terms of their harmonic mean lends 
itself to a natural interpretation: averaging of radial distances rather than their reciprocals.
4.2.2 Selecting a Rank Discrimination Threshold. Issue (II) concerns arbitrariness of rank 
discrimination in the original VAHP method (Section 4.1.5). Note that weak convexity 
constraints (13a) naturally suggest using  as the discrimination intensity function,  ),(d
which is reflected by constraint (13b). We are thus concerned solely with a proper selection of 
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, called accordingly the rank discrimination threshold. As this threshold is likely to severely 
affect the results, literature presents varied attempts to recommend how it is chosen. 
Specifically, Cook and Kress (1990) proposed to use the maximum feasible value of . 
However, Green et al. (1996) found this approach infringes on the basic principle of DEA. 
They suggested using  instead, which has been criticized by Noguchi et al. (2002) as 0
contradicting the basic purpose of ranking — a criticism which we share. Further, the 
intermediate value (5) proposed in turn by Noguchi et al. is prone to arbitrariness (Section 
4.1.5).
We have to conclude that whatever positive value be exogenously assigned to , it carries a 
subjective bias, favouring certain criteria  while disfavouring the others, and },,1{ Kk 
would therefore contradict the basic principle of DEA. For this reason, we adopt the 
perspective that such a bias ought to be removed by letting the data, in the spirit of DEA, 
‘speak for itself’ and determine rank discrimination endogenously. To this end, we employ a 
game-theoretic approach proposed in a different context by Tüselmann et al. (2015). This 
approach assumes criteria  to act like candidates in a preferential election and },,1{ Kk 
jointly settle on the value of  via bargaining (see Wu et al. 2009 for a related approach). We 
model this bargaining situation in terms of a K-person Nash bargaining problem, as follows 
(see also Pishchulov et al. 2014).
First, we determine the maximum amount  of rank discrimination for which problem (1), max
(2), (13), (4) remains feasible (Mehrabian et al. 2000). This is accomplished by solving
   s.t.  (2), (13), (4). (14)max 
Next, we elicit utility functions  that capture the utility extracted by candidate )(ku
 from a specific value . Let  represent that candidate’s cross-},,1{ Kk  ],0[ max  )(k
rating produced in Step 4 of the VAHP method (Section 3) using the DEA approach of 
Section 4.2.1 when given that value of . We accordingly define utility  as the standing  )(ku
of the candidate  among its peers, calculated as follows:k
. (15)
 1 ( ) ( ) 1( )




i i i i
u
K
   









Thus, a candidate’s standing indicates his position on the committee’s preference scale 
relative to the ‘average’ candidate after normalization of the scale length (Pishchulov et al. 
2014). Provided that the denominator in (15) is positive, it is easy to verify that the difference 
between the maximum and the minimum standing among the candidates is equal to unity, and 
that all standings total to zero. If the denominator in (15) happens to be zero then the standing 
of each candidate is defined to be zero as well.
Next, we determine the cross-ratings  for  at each of  equispaced values )(k },,1{ Kk  N
of  between 0 and . For each , this produces a series of  data points capturing the  max k N
utility function . We then interpolate this function on the range  by fitting a )(ku ],0[ max
polynomial  of degree  to  data points. In our experience,  is a sufficient )(ˆ ku m N 10N
number of points, for which  gives acceptable approximation  of .14m  )(ˆ ku )(ku
Consider then a K-person bargaining problem with the bargaining set U and disagreement 
point d:











The set U contains all K-dimensional utility vectors induced by the feasible values of , 
whereas d represents the vector of minimum utility levels of the respective candidates (Diskin 
and Felsenthal 2007). Note that U is by construction connected, closed and generally non-
convex. Using its convex hull, as in classical Nash bargaining, would not be suitable because 
the given bargaining setup does not permit lotteries over U — that is, a randomized choice of 
 — as an applicable bargaining outcome (Pishchulov et al. 2014). We therefore employ a 
generalization of Nash bargaining to non-convex problems (Zhou 1997) and determine the 
bargaining outcome by maximizing the K-person Nash product






1 Alternatively, when polynomial interpolation results in a significant oscillation of the polynomial between data 
points, ûk(ε) can be interpolated with polynomial splines to ensure monotonic transition between the points.
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on the interval . Note that (16) is a polynomial of degree  whose global maximum ],0[ max
Km
can be determined exactly. The maximizing value of  represents the bargaining outcome ,  ̂
which is to be used as the rank discrimination threshold in the DEA approach of Section 4.2.1. 
The next section illustrates the application of the method.
5. Application to Sustainable Supplier Selection
As indicated in Section 1, the environmental and social impact of corporate supply chains has 
become a vital topic on companies’ agendas which requires them to select suppliers in a way 
that respects all three sustainability dimensions: economic, environmental, and social. This 
significantly increases the number of evaluation criteria. Bearing in mind the multi-faceted 
nature of such an exercise, it should ideally involve a committee of experts so as to provide a 
balanced perspective on the importance of various criteria for the focal company. In this 
regard, the VAHP approach to supplier selection represents an attractive instrument requiring 
a parsimonious input from the committee members and thus letting them employ a 
comprehensive set of selection criteria. We have accordingly tested the feasibility of the 
revised VAHP method in a pilot application to sustainable supplier selection at a real-world 
company. The present section describes the procedure of this case-study and its results.
To conduct the study, we have partnered with a medium-sized company in the wood 
construction industry, based in Switzerland (the company name is not disclosed for 
confidentiality reasons). The company’s product line comprises highly customised build-to-
order and engineer-to-order dwelling and other building construction products involving 
lumber as its primary raw material. The company has seen a significant growth over the last 
few years and is currently expanding to international markets. Facing increasing sustainability 
concerns and its growing dependence on domestic as well as foreign suppliers, the company 
has indicated interest in conducting a pilot study on sustainable supplier selection so as to 
make its decisions in this area better informed and more systematic. It has commissioned for 
the study an expert committee comprising eight executive members who represent the 
company’s key functional departments and managerial roles: director of production 
department, two technical directors, director of product engineering department, marketing 
director, HR director, assistant director, and the CEO.
The study was conducted on the company’s premises in January 2018 and followed the six-
step procedure by Liu and Hai (2005) as outlined in Section 3. In preparation for Step 1, the 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
20
author team produced a catalogue of potential criteria for supplier evaluation, which was 
based on extant literature on supplier selection. Specifically our main source has been the 
recent study by Zimmer et al. (2016) who reviewed the literature on sustainable supplier 
selection and identified a comprehensive set of 448 selection criteria used in this stream of 
literature and spanning the economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainability.2 
As Zimmer et al. (2016) intentionally exclude from consideration those studies that focus 
solely on economic criteria, we have additionally referred to the respective stream of literature 
to ensure that our criteria list is comprehensive. In so doing, we have employed the seminal 
criteria list by Dickson (1966), augmented with more recent criteria from the reviews by 
Cheraghi et al. (2004) and Ho et al. (2010) as well as additional criteria relating to technical 
capability (Yahya and Kingsman 1999), order volume (Kannan and Tan 2002), and quality 
assurance (Kuo and Lin 2012). As the criteria identified by Zimmer et al. (2016) exhibit a 
significant overlap both among themselves and with the latter stream of work, we matched 
criteria with each other in order to eliminate their duplication. This has allowed us to reduce 
the entire list down to 142 criteria, of which 58, 46 and 38 respectively represent economic, 
environmental and social dimensions of sustainability.
In order to ensure an easier perception and discussion of individual criteria by the committee 
members, the criteria have been structured in a hierarchical fashion following Yahya and 
Kingsman (1999), Govindan et al. (2013) and Zimmer et al. (2016), as shown schematically 
in Figure 4. The resulting hierarchy is four-level, with levels below the root node representing 
the sustainability dimensions, criteria, and sub-criteria, from top to bottom. Furthermore, to 
facilitate perception and discussion of criteria by the committee members, all elements of the 
criteria hierarchy have been translated from English to French by one of the authors as a 
native French speaker. Then, in Step 1 of the method, the committee members have 
accordingly been presented with the entire list of 142 sub-criteria and their grouping to 
criteria and dimensions. Each of the members has been asked to indicate sub-criteria relevant 
for supplier selection at the company from his or her individual perspective and add missing 
criteria, if any. This has resulted in elimination of 14 irrelevant sub-criteria (3 economic, 8 
environmental, and 3 social). Five new sub-criteria were added: Live tracking, Reliability, 
Modifiable / adaptable place of delivery, Defective product disposal due to environmental 
standards, and Compliance with (social) commitments undertaken. Exclusions and additions 
2 We are thankful to Konrad Zimmer, Magnus Fröhling and Frank Schultmann of the Karlsruhe Institute of 
Technology, Germany, for providing us with the entire list of criteria identified in their work.
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have been discussed within the committee. This has resulted in 133 sub-criteria on the list. In 
Step 2 of the method, it was agreed to follow the initial hierarchical grouping of (sub-)criteria 
to criteria and dimensions, as no re-grouping has been suggested. Figure 4 indicates the actual 
number of elements at each level of the resulting criteria hierarchy. The full list of all sub-
criteria with their grouping to criteria and dimensions is presented in Appendix A.
In Step 3 of the method, the committee members have submitted their ordinal preferences 
with regard to the importance of elements at each level of the hierarchy relative to their 
respective parent node. This has been achieved by asking each committee member to rank 
order the sustainability dimensions with respect to the overall supplier selection goal; to rank 
order criteria with respect to their parent dimension; and to rank order sub-criteria with 
respect to their parent criteria. In this way, each committee member has submitted 1 + 3 + 29 
= 33 ordinal rankings, which corresponds to the total number of nodes in the first, second and 
third levels of the criteria hierarchy (Figure 4). In each single ranking, the committee 
members have been asked to rank order all available elements; therefore, it holds that L = K in 
the notation of Section 3. We note that the committee members have been able to submit their 
preferences anonymously and independently of each other, so as to exclude influence of the 
executives’ opinions on one another and allow them to express an unbiased view.
Step 4 of the method is intended to aggregate the individual preferences of the committee 
members to the group preferences. This has been accomplished by the author team using the 
revised method presented in Section 4.2. Specifically, this method must be successively 
applied at the root node, at each dimension node, and each criterion node with two or more 
children in the criteria hierarchy. This has resulted in 31 executions of the method. As 
explained in Section 4.2, each execution requires:
(i) solving problem (14) for determining the feasible range  of the rank max[0, ]
discrimination threshold ;
(ii) repeated solving of problems (1), (2), (13), (4) and (1aa), (2), (2a), (13), (4) for each 
 at each of  points within the range  for determining the },,1{ Kk  N max[0, ]
bargaining outcome ;̂































Note: The levels in the hierarchy below the root node represent dimensions, criteria, and sub-criteria, from top to bottom. The figures on the right indicate the actual number 
of elements at the respective level in the hierarchy. See Appendix A for their complete list.
Figure 4. Schematic representation of the criteria hierarchy produced in Steps 1 and 2 of the case-study. 
(3)
(29)
(133)… …… … … …
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This accordingly requires solving  linear programs during 1 2 2 2 ( 1) 1K N K K N       
each execution of the method. In (ii), we set  and use quartic polynomials for fitting a 10N 
utility function  to  data points represented by the standings , for each )(ˆ ku N )(ku
 (Section 4.2.2). This is illustrated for two economic criteria in Figure 5. The },,1{ Kk 
figure shows that the standing of a criterion can siginificantly change with  and may vary in 
a non-monotonic way. The mean absolute error (MAE) of curve fitting has the maximum 
value of approx. 0.008 across all 163 criteria, sub-criteria and dimensions acting as players in 
the bargaining game with their peers, while average MAE amounts to approx. 0.001. Taking 
into account that the players’ standings are located on the scale of a unit length (Section 4.2.2), 
this represents an acceptable accuracy.




















Figure 5. Fitting utility function  for criteria ‘Delivery’ (left) and ‘Discipline’ (right).)(ˆ ku



















Figure 6. Nash product in barganing between economic criteria (left), and social ones (right).
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Figure 6 (left) illustrates determination of the bargaining outcome  between the economic ̂
criteria, as a maximizer of the Nash product (16). The panel on the right illustrates the same 
for the social criteria and reveals that the Nash product may possess multiple local minima on 
the feasible range . The entire computational procedure has been implemented in max[0, ]
MATLAB R2017a and required approx. 145 seconds to run on a MacBook Pro computer with 
a 2 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU and 8 GB of RAM. Below we present the main results.
Table 1 refers to the root node of the criteria hierarchy (Figure 4) and presents the 
corresponding voting matrix V (see Section 3, Step 4) along with the resulting importance 
ratings of the three sustainability dimensions. As we can see in the table, the economic 
dimension is by far the most important dimension from the group perspective. At the same 
time, the social dimension markedly surpasses the environmental one in importance. The 
latter observation is rather counterintuitive if one takes into account that the majority of the 
sustainable supply chain management literature predominantly refers to the environmental 
dimension and largely neglects the social one.
Rank
Dimensions
1st 2nd 3rd Rating
Economic 7 1 0 0.51614
Environmental 0 4 4 0.19661
Social 1 5 2 0.28725
Table 1. Voting matrix and the resulting importance ratings of sustainability dimensions.
We proceed to the next level in the criteria hierarchy and present in Table 2 the relative 
importance ratings of criteria in each of the three sustainability dimensions (the respective 
voting matrices are omitted for reasons of space). We can observe that the number of criteria 
in each dimension is quite similar and amounts to 10, 9, and 10 in the economic, 
environmental and social dimensions respectively. Comparison of the rating scores within 
each dimension shows their significant variation among the economic criteria: the ratio of the 
maximum to the minimum rating (max/min ratio) amounts to approx. 7.9 — meaning that the 
most important economic criterion is rated by the committee almost 8 times higher than the 
least important one, whereas the same indicator amounts to ca. 3.5 and 1.8 among 
environmental and social criteria, respectively. This suggests that the committee discriminates 
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relatively strongly among economic criteria, less so among environmental ones, and least so 
among the social ones. Notably, the most important economic criterion has been found to be 
Quality, followed by Financial, Responsiveness, and Delivery, which aligns well with 
findings by Dickson (1966).
Economic criteria Rating Environmental criteria Rating Social criteria Rating
Quality 0.224 Env. commitment 0.197 Social commitment 0.137
Delivery 0.108 Env. management 0.091 Social management 0.094
Responsiveness 0.111 Env. capabilities 0.087 Child and forced labour 0.101
Technical capability 0.087 Material consumption 0.102 Occupational health & safety 0.116
Discipline 0.075 Energy consumption 0.094 Wages and working hours 0.094
Management 0.058 Emissions 0.073 Training of employees 0.108
Financial 0.161 Water usage 0.057 Employment relationship 0.098
Production & logistics 0.087 Waste 0.105 Discrimination and diversity 0.088
Facility 0.060 Env. product performance 0.194 Stakeholder involvement 0.075
External perception 0.028 Society 0.090
Table 2. Relative importance ratings of criteria in each sustainability dimension.
Proceeding to the next level down in the criteria hierarchy, we similarly obtain relative 
importance ratings of sub-criteria. By multiplying these with the relative importance ratings of 
their ancestor nodes (Section 3), we obtain the absolute importance ratings of all 133 sub-
criteria, which are presented in Appendix A. This concludes Step 4 of the revised VAHP 
method. Steps 5 and 6 ought to be conducted by the company in exactly the same way as in 
the original method by evaluating the candidate suppliers’ performance against each sub-
criterion (Step 5) and deriving supplier priority as a weighted average score (Step 6).
We conclude this section with a performance comparison between the original and revised 
VAHP methods. We refer first to the rank discrimination threshold used by either method. In 
Step 4, the original method uses the threshold defined by (5). Figure 7 (left) shows its 
distribution across 31 executions of the method in this step, relative to the maximum possible 
threshold value. As one can see, all threshold values happen to be in the lower third of the 
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feasible range. This is largely driven by formula (5), which sets the threshold in dependence 
from the number of ranking positions L and — in our study setting — automatically from the 
number of peers K. The right panel in Figure 7 illustrates this. The revised method lets the 
preference data determine the rank discrimination threshold using a bargaining approach, 
which results in a more flexible choice of rank discrimination. Figure 8 (left) illustrates this. 
Its right panel shows that while there is a degree of association between the threshold and the 
number of peers, it is pronounced significantly less than in the original method.













Relative  value vs. number of peers (Noguchi et al. 2002)
Figure 7. Distribution of the rank discrimination threshold in the original VAHP method, and 
its association with the number of peers across 31 executions of the method in Step 4.
















Relative  value vs. number of peers
Figure 8. Distribution of the rank discrimination threshold in the revised VAHP method, and 
its association with the number of peers across 31 executions of the method in Step 4.
While the original method tends to choose a relatively low rank discrimination threshold, it 
compensates this by discriminating the peer criteria by means of the strong convex order (3). 
The numerical results confirm this: for example, the max/min ratio of the relative importance 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
27
weights between the economic criteria amounts in the original method to ca. 95 when using 
geometric means for obtaining cross-ratings, as originally devised by Noguchi et al. (2002). 
The analysis in Section 4.1.5 reveals the likely reason for this: discrimination between high 
ranking positions, in comparison to low ones, becomes particularly strong when L is large, see 
equation (12). Thus, while (3) and (5) compensate for each other’s effect, they are likely to 
represent too rigid a combination of model elements.
6. Conclusion
The VAHP method is useful in group decision-making on supplier selection, especially where 
there are a large number of selection criteria and/or a large number of group members. We 
proposed a revision of the method that overcomes criticism of its DEA-based preference 
aggregation procedure by (i) eliminating arbitrariness, restrictiveness and possible non-
convexity of the order imposed on rank weights by the DEA model, and (ii) removing 
arbitrariness of rank discrimination by means of a bargaining approach, thus letting rank 
discrimination be data-driven in the DEA spirit.
We tested the feasibility of Steps 1 to 4 in the revised VAHP method using a pilot study of 
sustainable supplier selection at a real-world company. The comprehensive list of sustainable 
supplier selection criteria was based on work by Zimmer et al. (2016) and Dickson (1966).  
Our study contributes to business practice by providing a more robust VAHP tool that helps 
supply chain and purchasing managers select suppliers based on criteria spanning all three 
sustainability dimensions (economic, environmental, and social) while allowing parsimonious 
input by group decision-makers. Input required from managers is limited despite the fact that 
the criteria list is extensive and the VAHP approach allows for eliciting group members’ 
individual preferences in a timely manner.
Expert review from the pilot company provided overall positive feedback regarding the 
practicability and usefulness of the VAHP tool. The managers claimed that the exercise 
involving a broad list of supplier evaluation criteria activated a learning process regarding the 
scope of criteria that may play a role in selecting suppliers. According to their evaluation, the 
VAHP tool helps to conduct supplier selection more systematically as well as to communicate 
the company’s decisions to the suppliers with regard to supplier development, supplier 
switching, or termination of relationship. Furthermore, in-depth knowledge of a 
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comprehensive range of evaluation criteria prepares the company for negotiations with their 
own customers.
In our pilot application, social sustainability criteria were perceived overall as more important 
than environmental sustainability criteria. Further research is required to examine if this may 
be due to the specific case of the pilot company being situated in a context of high 
environmental expectations, standards, and regulation, therefore potentially alleviating the 
necessity of further scrutinizing supplier performance for environment sustainability. As 
companies are already bound by rather strict environmental government regulations in 
Switzerland, there might be less need to ensure such standards through supplier selection. 
Although Swiss law forces companies to comply with social sustainability criteria as well, in 
particular regarding labour rights and minimum standards, altogether company discretion on 
the social side could be considered higher than on the environmental side. Furthermore, 
attention to the social dimension at the case company could become increased during its 
recent period of growth, as giving due respect to social aspects has been considered by the 
management essential for sustaining the growth.
The revised method also lends itself to devise and include additional (sub-)criteria that are of 
special interest to the buying organisation. This enables a supplier selection process that more 
directly reflects the commercial and other interests of the buying company. This is even more 
so in a situation where a company operates or produces on behalf of a customer where this 
method would allow the provider or manufacturer to replicate its customers supplier selection 
criteria in its own procurement. However, in practice a large number of criteria used in 
supplier evaluation may require an unfeasible or disproportionate level of effort. In response 
to this, a possible approach could be culling those sub-criteria from the hierarchy that exhibit 
an importance weight below a certain threshold, either by applying a uniform threshold to all 
sub-criteria or using a threshold that is specific to each particular criterion. This would of 
course limit the benefits of the approach; therefore, the comprehensiveness of supplier 
assessment and its resource input need to be balanced, which represents an avenue for follow-
up research. Future research can also be targeted towards empirically testing VAHP against 
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Appendix A. Grouping of sub-criteria to criteria and dimensions, and their absolute importance rating.
I. Economic criteria Sub-criteria Rating
Quality Number of product rejects due to quality 0.0418
Supplier’s service, warranty and claim policies 0.0434




Modifiable / adaptable place of delivery 0.0111
Responsiveness Lead time 0.0258
With respect to urgent delivery requests 0.0202
Time taken to solve quality problems 0.0114
Technical Capability Range of products (type, variety) 0.0127
Traceability of technical problems 0.0059
Ability to solve technical problems 0.0164
R&D and innovation capability 0.0097
Discipline Honesty on transactions 0.0209
Compliance to policies and guidelines 0.0179
Management Attitude towards improvements, cooperation 0.0040
Business skill (customer service, employees) 0.0038
Partnership formation time 0.0022
Strategic goals 0.0020
Risk sharing capability 0.0038
Openness in exchange of information 0.0026
Access to markets, market analysis ability 0.0035




Financial Costs or price 0.0234
Quantity discounts 0.0111
Flexible cash terms 0.0160
Amount of past business (duration & quality) with the supplier 0.0092
Share of order volume in the supplier’s sales 0.0085
Strength and stability of supplier’s financial position 0.0069
Supplier’s growth 0.0047
Timely, meaningful and reliable financial reporting 0.0035
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Facility Infrastructure (accessibility, transportation modes) 0.0070
Local availability of skilled labour 0.0038
Local culture (e.g. corruption) 0.0027
Local legal system 0.0048
Local political stability 0.0019
Information and communication technology 0.0051
Machinery (level of automation, maintenance) 0.0032
Layout 0.0025
External Perception Public disclosure 0.0023
Acquired certificates 0.0030
Supplier’s market share 0.0011
Reputation within the branch of interest 0.0032
Reputation outside of the branch (overall reputation) 0.0015
Effect of contract with this supplier on other contracts 0.0015
Reputation of sub-tier suppliers 0.0012
Political influence 0.0009
II. Environmental criteria Sub-criteria Rating
Adoption of a sustainability mission (goals, target) 0.0048Environmental
Commitment Adoption of environmental code of conduct 0.0043
Commitment to green production 0.0041
Commitment to green logistics 0.0036
Commitment to green supply chain management 0.0041
Commitment to green marketing, eco-labelling 0.0034
Commitment to green investments 0.0031
Degree of R&D and investment into green technology 0.0033
Cooperation w.r.t. environmental improvements 0.0044
Employee training 0.0037
Adoption of environmental programs and plans 0.0071Environmental
Management Use of environmental management system and auditing 0.0065




Capabilities Sustainable product and process design capabilities 0.0054
Sustainable land use 0.0008
Environmental performance of upstream suppliers 0.0005
Environmental certification 0.0054
Defective product disposal due to environmental standards 0.0005
Material Consumption Consumption of materials 0.0089
Collection and remanufacturing of used products 0.0058
Collection and recycling of used products 0.0054
Energy Consumption Energy consumption or efficiency 0.0119
Use of energy from renewable energy sources 0.0066
Emissions Volume of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 0.0091
Volume of ozone depleting emissions 0.0053
Water Usage Volume of waste water produced 0.0056
Degree of water pollution 0.0056
Waste Volume of solid waste 0.0048
Volume of liquid waste 0.0050
Volume of hazardous waste 0.0064
Utilization or sale of waste or equipment 0.0044







Content of hazardous materials 0.0044
Undesirable byproducts 0.0037
III. Social criteria Sub-criteria Rating
Adoption of a sustainability mission (goals, target) 0.0118Social Commitment
Adoption of a social code of conduct 0.0072
Management commitment and participation 0.0070
Participation of employees (motivation and attitude) 0.0012
Certification 0.0118
Report of violations 0.0002
Social Management Observing and living the guiding policies 0.0269
Use of child labour 0.0111Child and Forced Labour
Use of forced labour 0.0072
Engagement in child trafficking 0.0108
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Use of a health and safety management system 0.0112Occupational Health and 
Safety Frequency of work-related accidents or illness 0.0101
Emergency preparedness/capability 0.0051
Use of safety training and auditing 0.0037
Health costs per employee 0.0032
Average working time 0.0059Wages and Working Hours
Offering a flexible working time 0.0031
Use of restrictions on overtime 0.0041
No work required on public holidays 0.0039
Fair wage level 0.0065
Overtime compensation 0.0033
Training of Employees Average hours of training per year per employee 0.0312
Type of employment contract 0.0097Employment Relationship
Protection for pregnant workers 0.0059
Career opportunities 0.0050
Annual employee turnover 0.0076
Diversity of workforce (age, gender, origin, minorities, disabilities, religion) 0.0074Discrimination and 
Diversity Gender balance of workforce 0.0039
Equal treatment of workforce, tolerance 0.0082
Number of incidents of harassment and violence recorded 0.0057
Compliance with commitments undertaken 0.0111Stakeholder Involvement
Effectiveness of supplier training in social issues 0.0043
Fair sourcing by the supplier 0.0062
Society Generation of employment 0.0097
Consumers education 0.0078




 A revised Voting Analytic Hierarchy Process is proposed.
 A novel procedure for aggregation of ordinal preferences.
 Featuring a data-driven bargaining approach.
 Application to sustainable supplier selection using a comprehensive set of criteria.
